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us out," apparently because they carried leaflets handed to 
them by the protesters. A 35-year-old housewife and her 
fourth-grade son were ejected when a marshal saw them 
speaking to a long-haired youth through a window. 
A Quaker Sunday school class of 12- and 13-year-olds 
who'd come to see their Quaker President, the 16-year-old 
daughter of a superior court judge and two grandchildren 
of a former Charlotte mayor received the same treatment. 
"Of co~rse they had on blue jeans," said the mother of the 
latter two in an angry letter to the editor of the Charlotte 
Observer. "Of course his hair is long. Isn't your son's?" By 
the time it was all over, five youths had been arrested. 
" It wasn't the Secret Service," said Deputy White House 
Press Secretary Gerald Warren. " It must have been local 
people." Local officials said, however, that the Secret 
Service gave the orders. 
Charlotte Chamber of Commerce President Charles 
Crutchfield, the initiator of the Graham Day program, said 
the decision to bar people from the Coliseum was based on 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
intelligence reports that "several hundred young people 
who had long hair and [who would be] dressed like hip-
pies . . . would take over the stage and disrupt the pro-
gram." He added that "the Secret Service instructed the 
police to examine very carefully all people with long hair 
and beards." One of the demonstrators said later that 
Crutchfield was crediting them with more organization 
than they ever dreamed of. 
Few people would deny that the Secret Service should 
act when the President is directly threatened. But the 
arbitrary actions in Charlotte show that it was more inter-
ested in preventing embarrassment than harm to Mr. 
Nixon. Such actions are taking on a pattern. Similar ones 
occurred when he appeared in Dayton in September. 
Former Secrct Service agent Rufus Youngblood, who 
protected Lyndon Johnson in Dallas when John Kennedy 
was shot, says agents today have to be "Nixon men" to 
get anywhere. Perhaps that explains a lot. 
WILLIAM ARTHUR, JR. and POLLY PADDOCK 
/ 
,..,-r/ 
SECRECY IN A FREE SOCIETY 
SEN. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr. 
Senator Ervin (D., N.C.) is chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Washington 
I am alarmed, as are my colleagues in the Congress, by 
the increasing frequency with which the executive branch 
withholds from Congress information vital to its legisla-
tive functions. Congress' decision-making role cannot be 
denied, but by the invocation of "executive privilege," 
the President, in effect, excludes the legislature from 
meaningful participation in that process. This dangerously 
expanding trend toward government by secrecy negates 
the constitutional principle of "a9couptability" as en-
visioned by the founding fathers , and does violence to 
the principle of separation of powers upon which our 
system of government is based. 
The term "executive privilege," as currently used, most 
commonly refers to a situation in which the executive 
branch refuses to divulge information requested by the 
Congress. It is a term employed more often by members 
of the legislative branch and by scholars than by the 
members of the executive branch who willfully withhold 
information. As I use the term, it refers to the executive 
branch's denial of ant.!dn~ of information to any person, 
be he a member of the Congress or 0 t e taxpaying public. 
The recent controversies surrounding the publication 
of the so-called "Pentagon Papers"; the court fight for 
the release of the Garwin Report on the SST; Represent-
ative Mink's pending suit against the Environmental 
Protection Agency, seeking release of the report on the 
ABC's proposed nuclear test on Amchitka Island, and 
the denial to Senator Fulbright of access to the five-year 
foreign military assistance plans have brought the issue 
sharply into focus in the public mind. 
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At issue in any consideration of executive privilege 
are three conflicting priIl tLples: (the alleged power of 
the President to withhold information, the disclosure of 
which he feels would impede the performance of his con-
stitutional responsibilities;~he power of the legislative 
branch to obtain information in order to legislate wisely 
and effectively~d the basic right of the taxpaying pub Ii 
to know what its government is doing) 
These opposing principles have clashed in almost every 
administration since the legislative branch undertook an 
investigation of the St. Clair Expedition during George 
Washington's first term as President. Without questioning 
the propriety of the investigation, President Washington 
asserted: 
First, that the House was an inquest, and therefore 
might institute inquiries. Second, that it might call for 
papers generally. Third, that the Executive ought to com-
municate such papers as the public good would permit 
and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would 
injure the public: consequently were to exercise a dis-
cretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor House 
had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who 
and whose papers were under the President alone; but 
that the committee should instruct their chairman to 
move the House to address the President. . 
In spite of his contention that the executive possessed 
the discretionary power-or duty-to refuse to communi-
cate any information "the disclosure of which would in-
jure the public," all of the St. Clair documents were 
turned over to the Congress. 
There is ample precedent for the view that Congress 
has the power to institute inquiries and exact evidence. 
"The power to legislate carries with it by implication 
ample authority to obtain information needed in the right-
ful exercise of that power and to employ compulsory 
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process for the purpose .... " McGrain v. Daugherty 273 
U.S. 165 (1927). 
Although the Constitution is silent with regard to the 
existence of executive privilege, its exercise is now asserted 
to be an inherent power of the President. Its constitutional 
basis allegedly derives from the duty imposed upon the 
President under Article II S.3 to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed. The President claims the power on the 
ground that he must have it in order to provide the execu-
tive branch with the autonomy needed to discharge its 
duties properly. Inasmuch as "the Presid~nt alone ~d 
unaided could not execute the laws ... , but reqwres 
"the assistance of subordinates"-Myers v. U.S. 272 U.S. 
117 (1926 )-the alleged authority to exercise executive 
privilege has been extended in practice to the entire 
executive branch. 
In theory, the release of information from the execu-
tive branch is governed in part by Executive Order No. 
10501, issued by President Eisenhower, and amende.d by 
him in Executive Order No. 10816, and by PreSident 
Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10964. These orders 
establish a system of security classifications for informa-
tion on defense matters whose release might injure or 
embarrass our national defense or our relations with 
foreign nations.~uch order are not authorit to as 
executive rivilege; t e s· or i or restrict disclo ure 
o classifi rna en . 
- President "Kennedy attempted to end the practice of 
delegating to employees of the executive branch the au-
thority to claim executive privilege. In a letter to. the 
House Foreign Operations and Government .subcommittee 
in 1962, he stated that the basic policy of his administra-
tion would be that "Executive rivile e can be i v ed 
on!! by the President arid will not be used without s~cific 
Pr£iidential approval." Presidents. Johnson and Nixon 
reaffirmed this policy. Thus, theoretically, procedures 
instituted in the executive branch would place with the 
President the ultimate decision and responsibility for the 
exercise of executive privilege. However, throughout my 
years in the Senate, I have learned that there is a great 
discrepancy between theory and practice, a discrepancy 
,demonstrated, among other ways, by Congress' continuing 
in'ability to obtain information from the executive branch. 
The asserted doctrine of executive privilege has 
developed unrestrained. In the absence of any Congres-
sional statutory authority or constitutional grant of the 
power, the will of each succeeding Presi<!eE!., has be~n 
substituted for le 'slation in the fi . A contest of polit-
ica power between the Presi~ent and Congress. has 
superseded the proper administration of federal functions 
by the President under the restraints that would be pro-
vided by effective legislative oversight. Nor have the 
courts given any definite guidance on the issue, although 
the Reynolds 345 U.S. 1 (1953) and Curtiss-Wright 299 
U.S. 304 (1936) cases do contain some dicta relating 
to the problem. 
The assertion of executive privilege, or the power to 
withhold information, written and spoken, from Congress 
and the public under the assumed "inherent executive pow-
er," must I think be viewed in the context of the slowly but 
steadily increasing power of the executive-a development 
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that has been duly noted by numerous political and legal 
scholars. This increased power has enabled the executive 
branch to make crucial decisions without answering to 
any system of formal "accountability" for the exercise 
of such powers beyond the Presidential election every four 
years. Because the President has been able to act through 
Executive Orders without the inconvenience and restraints 
of Congressional authorization or delegation of power, 
the principle of the separation' of governmental powers has 
been seriously erode~. 
In all candor, we in the legislative branch must confess 
that the shifting of power to the executive branch has 
resulted from our failure to assert our own constitutional 
powers. Other than issue sporadic complaints, members 
and committees of the Congress have done little to pre-
vent the executive branch from withholding information 
when, in its sole discretion, it determined that secrecy was 
necessary-or politically desirable. Moreover, through 
the almost unlimited delegation of authority to the 
bureaucracy, Congress has actively e'iiCOUraged the aggran-
dizement of executive power. The executive branch has 
access to information which the Congress cannot possibly 
match, and it has asserted the discretionary authority to 
employ that data in performing its myriad tasks. I fear 
that the steady increase of executive power has come close 
to creating a "government of men, not of laws." 
The practice 'of executive privilege, it seems to me, 
clearly contravenes the basic principle that the free flow 
of ideas and information, and the open and full disclosure 
of the governing process, are essential to the operation 
of a free society. Throughout history, rulers have im-
posed secrecy on their actions in order to enslave the 
citizenry in bonds of ignorance. By contrast, a govern-
ment whose actions are completely visible to all of its 
citizens best protects the freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution. 
Moreover, it is clear that the invocation of executive 
privilege is contrary to the spir:it, if not the letter, of the 
/ Freedom of Informatio~t (5 U.S.C. 552) , which 
'cOngress pasSeo with the express purpose of expanding 
to the fullest practical extent the full disclosure to the 
public of the actions of the government. While it provides 
for nwe sp!;Cific exceE!j.ons, it likewise specifies that none 
of those exceptions constitutes authority to withhold in-
formation from the C~>Dgress. Section (4) (c) of the Act 
explicitly states, "This section is not authority to withhold 
information from Congress." 
It also can be argued with some cogency that the 
practice contravenes the philosophical thrust of the 1952 
Supreme Court case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyers, 34? U.S. 579, where the Court invalidated 
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills by Executive 
Order. The several majority opinions in that case indi-
cate that Congress is a co-equal branch of the government, 
and that its prerogatives may not be usurped or impeded 
by actions of the executive. 
Beyond the penchant for maintaining secrecy 
through the invocation of executive privilege, a mor 
generalized attempt is made to withhold information 
through the class~jon ..astern, the infirmities of which 
were so clearlyreflected in the recent furor over the Penta-
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gon Papers, and in the general failure or refusal to disclose 
data which are of potential interest to the public. When 
the people do not know what their government is doing, 
those who govern are not accountable for their actions-
and accountability is basic to the democratic system. By 
using devices of secrecy, the government attains the power 
to ."~ana~e" the news ~d through it to m~nipulate public 
oplDlon. uch power IS not consonant WIth a nation of 
free men. Thus the exercise of the assumed power of 
executive privilege is of basic importance to our govern-
mental system, and the ramifications of a growing policy 
of governmental secrecy is extremely dangerous to our 
liberty. 
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation 
of Powers, of which I am chairman, was mindful of these 
dangers when it initiated its study on the subject, and 
recently held hearings on executive privilege. It found 
that the nation's history contains many examples of 
Congressional demands for information that have been 
countered with ~he invocation of executive privilege or 
some other bureaucratic excuse for failing to reply. These 
practices include delaying tactics which continue for so 
long that the information, when submitted, is no longer 
pertinent, and the placing of security classifications upon 
information that is supplied, thereby preventing any 
meaningful use of the data. Such practices reflect a cer-
tain contempt for Congressional requests for information 
and an apparent disdain for the right of the American 
?eople to be informed fully about the operations of their 
government. 
As chairman of another subcommittee-the Senate Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights-I have for 
some time attempted to obtain ~ormation pertinent to 
a ~tudy. of. Arm ~ce and data bank programs 
which infnnge on the prIvacy and First Amendment 
rights of citizens. While some ' of my requests for informa-
tion ROd for the appearance of witnesses have been granted, 
the most important have been denied for the following 
stated reasons: 
. . . we are precluded by consistent Executive branch 
policy from releasing to the pUblic. (1. Fred Buzhardt, 
General Counsel, Department oj Dejense) 
Inappropriate to authorize the release of these docu-
ments. (Melvin LAird, Secretary oj Dejense) 
This !nfo~mation is solely for your use in conducting 
your mqUJry. (R. Kenly Webster, Acting General Coun-
sel, Department oj Army) 
The records . . . cannot be obtained without an inor-
dinate expenditure of time and effort. (R. Kenly Web-
ster, Acting General Counsel, Department oj Army) 
No useful purpose would be served by a public report 
on the materials . . . . (1. Fred Buzhardt, General Coun-
sel, Department oj Dejense) 
I do not believe it appropriate that the general o£.urs 
in question appear before your Subcommittee, butt'that 
an~ "desired testimony". . . should be furnished by my 
deSIgnated representative. (Emphasis added.) (Melvin 
Laird, Secretary oj Dejense) . 
Implicit in these rebuffs to me and the subcommittee 
is the assumption of these officers of the executive branch 
tha~ they. are entitled to dictate what may appropriately 
?e lO~estl.gated and the scope of any such "appropriate" 
lDveStIgatJon. 
In action, our system of government is not one of 
strictly separated powers, but a government based upon 
the conceP.t of ~eparate but balanced powers, divided 
along functional lmes. For obvious reasons, such a system 
could not and does not operate in strict conformity to 
the underlying principle. 
The founding fathers fully understood that govern-
mental responsibility must be shared in order to make the 
whole fabric of government viable. Yet they knew that 
each branch must maintain a basic respect for the duties 
and prerogatives of the other branches and that such 
divisions are mandatory in order to avoid the undue accre-
vadlllo. Siempre (MaIco) 
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mans are assailing him for having "sold out" Germany 
in his negotiations with Moscow and Warsaw. Brandt 
J;Ules by virtue of a coalition of his Social Democrats 
with the small Free Democratic Party, which fared badly 
in a recent by-election. He has a margin of only six in 
the Bundestag of 496. In Bonn's upper house, the Bun-
desrat, his coalition is in the minority. If the Bundesrat 
rejects the treaties, Brandt must get an absolute majority 
in the Bundestag-249 votes. At present he has only a 
paper-thin margin by which to override the upper house 
-251 votes--and he has no assurance of holding all 
251. He might pick up some defections from the opposi-
tion Christian Democratic Union, but that is speculation. 
Brandt's best hope lies in popular support in West 
Germany. Older Germans remember Hitler, and educa-
ted young Germans have some idea of what went on after 
the Nazis came to power in 1933. In 1935 the Nobel 
Peace Prize went to the Junker pacifist, Carl von Ossi-
tzky, who was to die slowly in a Nazi concentration 
camp. Brandt is the first German since Ossietzky to re-
. ceivc the peace prize-and the first to deserve it. What 
course ti1~ West Germans will take is of overriding inter-
national importance. If the treaties are turned down, the 
well-founded Soviet phobia about Germany will revive in 
full force. Men of good will everywhere will rejoice at the 
honor bestowed on Willy Brandt, but its political effect 
remains to be seen. 
The Nominator 
In an obscure newspaper item, we noticed that among 
those who had nominated Willy Brandt for the Nobel 
Peace Prize was Dr. Wolfgang Yourgrau, a professor of 
the history of science at Denver University. Pleased to 
see that someone in this country had had something to 
do with a nomination of which we heartily approved, we 
aroused him out of a Sunday nap by telephone, and learned 
the following: 
Dr. Yourgrau was born in Germany of a Belgian fa-
ther and a German-Jewish mother. He attended the 
University of Berlin, majoring in physics. He wa~ one 
of the organizers of a small splinter offshoot of the So-
cialist Party, opposed to the Communists and the Social 
Democrats alike, and of course anti-Fascist. He was re-
cruited by and served with the American OSS during the 
war, and subsequently came to the United States. He has 
been at Denver for the past eight years. 
He remained politically active to the extent of lecturing 
from time to time in Sweden and Norway, at the Univer-
sity of Oslo 'and elsewhere. He has also lectured in both 
East and West Germany. He feels that it is important to 
try to explain some aspects of U.S. policy in both camps 
and to keep in touch with German opinion, East and 
West. In August 1970, and again in November, he wrote 
letters to the nominating committee, suggesting Brandt as 
a suitable recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
Yourgrau has never met Brandt and has no ties what-
soever with him. He nominated him because he thought 
that what Brandt had done and was doing was of the 
greatest importance. Y ourgrau is in the fortunate ( and 
rare) position of being able to talk to East and West 
without being subservient to either. His basic loyalties are 
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firm. Operating from a base in the United States and 
with his war record, he is in a position to be impartial 
and to speak candidly to both sides. Brandt, it se.emed 
to Y ourgrau, was a key figure for somewhat the same 
reasons, although, since he occupies a high official posi-
tion, there are differences in their respective approaches. 
Nonetheless, Brandt is the only statesman Yourgrau 
knows about wQo can journey to Moscow and to Wash-
ington, and in each capital say exactly what he thinks 
and what needs urgently to be said. 
Yourgrau does not know whether, .on balance, 
Brandt's status as a Nobel laureate will harm or help 
him in the internal politics of Germany. There were both 
long and short-term reasons for nominating him. In prac-
tical politics one must take chances. There were five 
Brandt nominators besides Yourgrau but the fact that 
Yourgrau, an American, is known in Sweden and Norway 
may have helped. Regardless of tl1e amount of influence 
Yourgrau's initiative may have exerted, it is good to 
know that someone in this country saw what needed to 
be done, and did it. 
Nursing Nixon 
The Secret Service, charged with protecting the Presi-
dent, appears to be also engaged in the political role of 
selecting his audiences for him. When Mr. Nixon appeared 
at Billy Graham Day ceremonies in the Charlotte, N.C. 
Coliseum on October 15, local policemen, Secret S~rvice 
men and unidentified "marshals" barred from the building 
long-haired males and persons in "hippie" attire, even 
if those persons had tickets. 
The affair had been widely advertised as a "nonpolitical" 
event by the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce. Free tick-
ets were available from local banks on a first-come-first-
served basis. Some 13,000 persons filled the Coliseum to 
see Nixon and Graham pay tribute to each other. A pri-
vate reception for Graham, complete with cruciform sand-
wiches, was attended later by President and Mrs. Nixon. 
. Many anti-Nixon protesters-including members of a 
local organization, the Charlotte chapter of V~tnam Vet-
erans Against the War, and a number of coHege studuts 
-were turned away from the public ceremony. There was 
a large, well-mannered contingent from nearby Davidson 
College, a small Presbyterian institution. More came from 
other local colleges, and a group of about twenty-five 
made the 125-mile trip from the University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill. 
At first ushers told the students they could not enter 
with banners, !:ut explained to newsmen that everyone 
would be "welcomed without banners." It soon became 
evident, however, that the youths weren't going to be ad-
mitted under any circumstances-and during the course 
of the afternoon more than 1 00 were denied admission. 
Some were tossed out bodily with no explanation; others 
were informed that their tickets were "counterfeit," and 
many had their tickets ripped up. • 
But the broad broom used by the "marshals" also swep 
away many innocent and unsuspecting citizens-including 
some Nixon supporters. Three off-duty newsmen from 
WBT radio--one of whom. had worked actively in Nixon's 
Presidential campaign-said the marshals "literally threw 
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tion of power in anyone branch of the federal government. 
As Madison observed in the Federalist No. 48, "After 
discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of 
power, as they may in their nature be legislative, execu-
tive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to 
provide some pmctical security for each . ... " 
However overlapping the functions of the three branches 
may be, and however imprecisely the system may seem 
to work, the doctrine of separation of powers itself is 
based upon good and sound grounds and the ends it was 
designed to serve 200 years ago are at least as im-
portant today. Legislative remedies being considered by 
the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers would afford 
the legislative and executive branches an opportunity to 
seek -together some common ground that would more 
clearly define the powers, duties and prerogatives of the 
two branches in this sensitive area. We must remember 
at all times that cooperation between the Congress and 
the executive is essential, if the government is to operate 
efficiently. That· pressing requirement makes it mandatory 
that we seek and find an amicable settlement to the 
problems involved in the use of executive privilege to 
prevent Congress and the American people from knowing 
the details of executive actions. To paraphrase Woodrow 
Wilson, warfare between the legislative and the execu-
tive branches can be fatal. 0 
Pa.kistan: What Never Gets Said 
PAUL DEUTSCIDIAN 
Mr. Deutschman has been a foreign editor of Life, an official 
in the Marshall Plan and in AID, and a foreign correspondent 
covering Europe. Asia and A/rica. His first novel is scheduled 
for publication by Dial Press next year. 
There are very large aspects to the present troubles in 
Pakistan and the entire Indian subcontinent about which 
nothing is ever said. Both press coverage and public spec-
ulations concentrate on what is readily visible-the geno-
cidal war waged by the Pakistani Army against the people 
of East Pakistan; the independence movement there; the 
terrible plight of the millions of refugees who in the past 
several months have crossed over into India; revelations 
about the possible malfeasance, stupidity or just plain 
bumbling bureaucracy involved with the delivery of those 
shiploads of military hardware; the economic aid cutoffs 
recently voted through Congress, etc. 
At the risk of seeming to lack compassion, I think the 
time is long overdue to mention some of the unmention-
ables. They may give some clues as to what our govern-
ment may well be contemplating within the closed 
chambers where all those top-secret papers are composed 
and contingency tactics mocked up. It may also reveal a 
possible way out of the present impasse. And if a way out 
is not found, the public must prepare itself for some really 
rude future shocks in the next few weeks. 
There is, to begin, the background of unspoken emo-
tional and psychological realities. For example: 
(1) The subcontinent is beset by harsh tribal differences 
and enmities. At the time of partition, the two chief "war-
rior tribes" of the area, Punjabis and Sikhs (joint main-
stays of the old British Indian Army), arrayed themselves 
on opposite sides and formed ·the mainstays of the Pald-
stani and Indian Armies. 
Further, the Moslems of West Pakistan (fantasizing 
themselves as descendants of the Mogul conquerors) feel 
disdain for all the Hindus-those within their own borders 
(both "wings" ) , certainly, and also those in India. They 
make an exception, perhaps, for the Sikhs, whom they 
simply hate-a sentiment that is staunchly reciprocated. 
Further still, far down the line in subcontinental "tribal" 
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esteem-on both sides of the borders-are the supposedly 
meek and energyless Bengalis. Both nations tend to dis-
regard and look down upon their respective Bengalis, 
whether of Moslem or Hindu religion. 
(2) The religious differences are well known, but the 
outside world is insufficiently aware of the crucial fact 
that these differences are reflected in rival philosophies of 
statehood. In principle, Pakistan is a theocratic state and 
India a secular one. In India, the Moslems are a strong and ( 
integrated minority, part of the socio-political mainstream; 
in Pakistan, it is not unfair to say that Hindus are a merel 
"tolerated" minority-as peripheral to the mainstream 
there as, perhaps, 1 ews are in Morocco or Protestants in 
Italy. 
This difference causes certain unmentioned problems: 
India can barely tolerate the idea of Pakistan, based, as it 
is, on religion, and thus the antithesis of its own premise 
for sovereign existence. Pakistan, meanwhile, cannot ac-
cept for very long the idea that some of the subcontinent's 
60 million Moslems are not included within its borders-
thus contradicting its premise for sovereign existence. 
(3) We all "know" about the "fatalism" toward life in 
Asia. About the "grinding poverty" ; about how the "peo-
ple-hunger balance" teeters most dangerously there-the 
increasing production of grain and other basic foodstuffs, 
despite all efforts, being continuously outstripped by the 
increasing production of people. But unless you have per-
sonally immersed yourself in certain parts of Asia-have, 
for example, strolled along the back streets of Calcutta 
at sundown in ~'Jmmertime, or through downtown Dacca 
during 'the rainy season-you cannot understand how little 
difference there can be, truly, between life and death for 
so many Asians. Ana it is completely ironic, therefore, 
that the geographical cockpit of this present dispute en-
compasses both Calcutta and Dacca, undoubtedly the two 
most luxuriant cesspools of human misery on this planet. 
Also, compassion aside, the East Pakistan refugees 
should be viewed in terms of living conditions they left 
behind them as well as those in which they. now find them ( 
selves. We've seen photos of hungry, brutalized refugees 
living in cramped sections of sewer pipe in bare Indian 
fields. But we might also wish to see how the people down 
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